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Catalytic Innovation in Microfinance for Inclusive Growth: 





ABSTRACT. Microfinance offers a means for reaching the poor who are left out of the formal 
financial sector. A fundamentally new way is needed to create a scalable and sustainable 
business model to meet this unmet need – a catalytic innovation. Our study focused on Swayam 
Krishi Sangam (SKS), an archetype of a catalytic innovator. The insights gained from our three-
year longitudinal study led to the proposed framework for a catalytic innovator encompassing 
five factors: customer focus on the poor and social entrepreneurship for the social mission; 
operational innovation, information technology and human capital management for scaling and 
financial sustainability.  
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Inclusive growth has been succinctly defined by the Asian Development Bank as “growth 
that not only creates new economic opportunities, but also ensures equal access to the 
opportunities created for all segments of society, particularly for the poor.” (Ali and Son, 2007, 
p. 12) Over one billion people lack access to basic financial services, which is strongly correlated 
with low incomes. A study by Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) showed that 
countries with higher poverty rates have the lowest penetration of deposit accounts per 100 
adults. Specifically, 70% of adults in developing countries are still excluded from the regulated 
financial system. (CGAP, 2009) 
Our study focused on India since it has the world’s largest number of poor people in a 
single country. An estimated 300 million, out of the total population of over a billion live under 
the poverty line of $1.25 per day (World Bank, 2005a). Although India has the fourth largest 
banking infrastructure in the world, 94% of its 600,000 odd villages do not have a single Branch. 
The number of households facing financial exclusion is estimated at 120 million by CRISIL 
(2009). It takes an average of 33 weeks to get a loan approved in rural India, with borrowers 
having to pay up to 42% of their loan amounts in bribe to officials. (World Bank, 2005b)  
 Microfinance provides financial services such as loans, savings and insurance to the poor 
who are left out of the formal financial sector. The prefix, “micro”, highlights the distinct feature 
of these services: they involve small amounts of money, frequently less than $100. Commercial 
banks do not serve poor people for several reasons. A poor person cannot secure a loan because 
of lack of collateral. The person may not be literate enough to complete the paperwork to open a 
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savings account. A small loan, or savings account with a small balance, yields only a tiny profit. 
The underlying economics also provide no incentive for banks to reach the poor in remote 
locations in rural areas. The cost of establishing a rural finance network in a remote area is 
estimated to be 80% higher than in a more accessible region.  
At the heart of microfinance is microcredit which provides small, unsecured loans to 
individuals to establish or sustain a small business and generate income. A vast majority of loans 
go to women because studies have shown that women tend to undertake small, manageable 
activities rather than risky ventures, and they are more likely to reinvest their earnings in the 
household for the benefit of the entire family. An important element of microcredit is the 
recycling of funds. When loans are repaid, usually in six months to a year, they are re-loaned.  
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) have traditionally been backed by government agencies 
and charitable organizations. A limited pool of donor funds, however, inhibits scaling for 
reaching the poor. The 2009 State of the Microcredit Summit Campaign Report indicated that 
75% of the 3,552 MFIs covered by the study are small organizations serving less than 2,500 
customers, with only 1.4% of the customers reached by them as the poorest living on $1 a day or 
less. In contrast, the 16 large financial institutions with over a million clients each had a 
penetration of over 25% in the poorest segment (Daley-Harris, 2009). Aside from capital, MFIs 
face two other obstacles to scale: high cost of handling millions of small transactions, and lack of 
standardized business processes.  
What’s required is a fundamentally new way to meet the unmet need for financial 
services at the bottom of the pyramid (BOP). Clayton Christensen et al. (2006) coined the term 
catalytic innovation for new solutions that bring about social change, often on a national scale. 
They defined a catalytic innovation as a scalable, sustainable, and systems-changing solution 
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that meets a need that is not served at all. Their paper delineates five ways of identifying 
catalytic innovators using several examples, including Grameen Bank in microfinance. Our study 
addresses the research question: what are the factors that would make an MFI a catalytic 
innovator in microfinance? In our attempt to develop a framework, we draw upon management 
literature in two distinct fields. First, the theory of the resource-based view of the firm postulates 
that a firm’s resources include tangible and intangible assets such as “brand names, in-house 
knowledge of technology, employment of skilled personnel, efficient procedures, capital, etc.” 
(Wernerfelt, 1984, p. 172). This perspective provided the lens for formulating some of the 
success factors for a catalytic innovator. Second, the literature on social entrepreneurship, while 
still in an embryonic stage according to Short et al. (2009), fueled our thinking since 
microfinance as a means for bringing about financial inclusion is indeed a social venture. 
We selected Swayam Krishi Sangam (SKS) Microfinance as the research site for our 
study since it stood out in the microfinance industry in India for the scale it had achieved in 
providing microcredit to the rural poor suffering from financial exclusion, and achieving a 
double bottom-line. Our three-year study of SKS identified five factors that worked in concert 
for SKS to meet the criteria posited by Christensen et al for a catalytic innovator.  
To put the social innovation engineered by SKS in perspective, we begin with an 
overview of three distinct innovations that brought microfinance into the limelight as an industry 
that can do well and do good. The next section outlines the research methodology. The main 
body of the paper presents the proposed framework that resulted from our study of SKS 
chronicling its growth and analyzing the factors that have made it a catalytic innovator in 
microfinance. Further research is required to validate the framework derived from the SKS study 
by applying it to other prominent MFIs in India, which have attained scale and are committed to 
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a social mission. 
 
 
INNOVATIONS IN MICROFINANCE 
Grameen Bank of Bangladesh pioneered an ingenious method of advancing credit 
without any collateral to poor women in rural areas for starting a small business. The innovation 
in the Grameen model was the group-lending methodology, where loans are made to self-
selected groups of five women to be repaid in weekly installments. The group acts as the 
guarantor for the loan – if one member cannot make the weekly payment, the others will make 
up the difference. The collective responsibility of the group serves as the social collateral for the 
loan. This model minimizes transaction costs relating to selection of clients since members of the 
group have more information about each other, and can exert peer pressure for prompt 
repayment. The discipline of regular weekly meetings also reduces the risk of default (Greeley, 
2006). Grameen’s founder, Muhammad Yunus, believed that charity is not an answer to poverty. 
His experiment proved that the poor do not lack ideas, motivation, skill or entrepreneurial spirit 
to start income-generating activities to improve their livelihoods. The Nobel Peace Prize of 2006 
shared by Yunus with the bank recognized the social impact of microfinance and stimulated a 
global interest in micro-lending. 
The second innovation in microfinance was the transition from a not-for-profit to a for-
profit model for overcoming the constraint of limited donor funds for scaling. Microfinance 
became an attractive proposition for banks and institutional investors for two reasons. First, the 
large potential demand for financial services at the BOP in the developing world is estimated at 
$300 billion by JP Morgan. Second, MFIs had a low default rate, below 3% in many cases, 
compared to the write-off of 5% of outstanding credit balances by US credit card issuers. Big 
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banks saw the business opportunity to team up with MFIs to extend their reach to the BOP, and 
do well and do good by providing credit and increasing the earning potential of the poor. Several 
banks have already done so. For instance, ICICI Bank, the second-largest commercial bank in 
India, has benefited from a partnership model with MFIs to expand its outreach to low-income 
clients who are not covered by their Branch network. Partnering with MFIs helps ICICI also 
meet the target set by the government for financial inclusion: 40% of a bank’s lending should be 
to priority sectors, including 18% to farmers.  
Institutional investors also began to provide direct backing to MFIs in 2007. The initial 
public offer (IPO) of Banco Compartamos, Mexico’s biggest MFI, in April 2007 was a landmark 
event that heralded the interest of private investors in microfinance. Compartamos raised $498 
million by selling off about a third of its equity which demystified microfinance as an industry 
for just “do-gooders”. The for-profit model, however, runs the risk of mission drift because of 
commercial pressures to generate a return to its investors, which became evident in the case of 
Compartamos. At the end of 2007, it had a portfolio of $316 million lent to 765,000 clients at 
annual interest rates that could exceed 100%. Loan officers earned bonuses of up to 120% of 
their salaries which made them sign up clients for more loans regardless of their needs. Investors 
earned an average annual return on equity of 53% between 2000 and 2007 (Epstein & Smith, 
2007). The exceptional financial performance of Compartamos clearly came at a social cost of 
overcharging borrowers, and demonstrated the danger of an MFI losing sight of the focus on 
poor customers in a for-profit model. 
 The risk of mission drift is eliminated by the third innovation, an entirely new model of 
microfinance on the Web - online micro-lending. Instead of commercial capital, a brand new 
virtual class of individual investors provides the capital for microfinance. Donors make loans to 
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poor people for establishing or expanding their small businesses, instead of giving charitable 
hand-outs to them. The lender gets the money back making the loan a gift that keeps on giving. 
Kiva.org was the first to launch a peer-to-peer lending portal in 2005 where profiles of 
microentrepreneurs from developing countries are posted. Visitors can click through the pictures 
and personal stories to choose the person they want to fund, and make a loan of as little as $25 
using a credit card. Kiva partners with existing MFIs in the developing world, who choose 
qualified borrowers, distribute the loan and collect repayments. Updates of the borrower’s 
business are posted on the website. The lender also receives email journal updates about the 
sponsored business throughout the six -12 month duration of the loan. The funds are returned to 
the lender as loans get repaid, which could be funneled into another loan. By October 2009, Kiva 
had reached over 239,000 entrepreneurs in over 50 countries, disbursing over $100 million from 
573,000 lenders – proof that people see the value of social investments even in difficult 
economic times (Sys-con, 2009). Kiva is not yet present in India because of government 
regulations that require Kiva to be approved by the central bank. However, two peer-to-peer 
lending portals, Rang De and dhanaX.com, were launched in 2008 using a model similar to 
Kiva.org. The online model is still in a nascent stage. A critical issue is whether the MFIs in the 
developing countries, who actually select the micro-entrepreneurs, are indeed targeting poor 
people. Further, the viability of online lending to reach significant numbers is limited by the 
infrastructure in rural areas in developing countries, including India.  
Our study looks at the dominant brick-and-mortar MFI model prevalent in India for 





Our interest in microfinance and SKS in particular was sparked by the inclusion of 
Vikram Akula, the founder of SKS, among the “TIME 100: The People Who Shape Our World” 
in 2006. He was recognized by Time magazine for use of smart-card technologies to dispense 
small loans to the poor “in the hinterlands with few landlines, let alone ATMs making SKS one 
of the fastest-growing micro-lenders, having dispensed $52 million to 221,000 clients since 
1998…(with) a default rate below 2% by using software that provides real time data” (Rawe, 
2006, p.1). The novelty of this accomplishment in a non-traditional business, with technology 
playing a significant role, motivated us to study how SKS did it. 
SKS was launched in 1998 in Hyderabad in the state of Andhra Pradesh (AP) as a not-
for-profit with a social mission to “empower the poor to become economically self-reliant”. The 
Grameen model for making loans to poor women using social collateral was modified by SKS. It 
began operations in the drought-prone Deccan region of AP not covered by other MFIs already 
operating in AP. From 1999 to 2004, SKS focused on perfecting its systems and processes in AP, 
and had scaled by end-March 2004 to over 85,000 clients with a 99% repayment rate. In April 
2004, SKS expanded to four adjacent states simultaneously, a first for any MFI in India. By 
March 2006, SKS members totaled 201,493. In July 2006, SKS extended operations to six states 
in North India which are considered “tough” to operate in, expanding the total number of clients 
to over 600,000 by March 2007.  
Recognizing the need for capital to expand outreach, SKS converted to a for-profit 
company in August 2005. By this time Akula had proven the ability of SKS to scale with a 
default rate of less than 1%, a pre-requisite for attracting private capital. The equity investment 
of Sequoia Capital (a venture capital firm reputed for its early-stage investments in Yahoo!, 
YouTube and Google) among others in March 2007 was indicative of the investors’ confidence 
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in the financial viability of the SKS model. SKS was, however, cognizant of its social mission 
even after becoming a for-profit company. The Microcredit Summit Campaign Report verified 
that 90.5% of the 134,346 SKS clients as of December 31, 2005 were below the poverty line of 
$1 a day (Daley-Harris, 2006).  
SKS qualified as a research site for our study since it satisfied the criteria laid by 
Christensen et al for a catalytic innovator. First, it met the need for microcredit of the poor, who 
are not reached by mainstream financial services. It had achieved scale from just 10 customers in 
1998 to over 600,000 by March 2007 when we started our research. The wide geographical 
footprint of SKS manifested by early 2007, with the focus on underserved areas, provided 
additional evidence of SKS meeting an unmet need. The infusion of private capital to fuel its 
growth substantiated the financial sustainability of the company. Finally, data from industry 
rating reports verified that SKS did not abandon its social mission after becoming a for-profit 
company.  
We began with an extensive review of the rich literature in microfinance ranging from 
academic papers in journals of development economics to numerous studies by international 
organization and their affiliated agencies to help us understand the factors underlying the growth 
and dynamics of the microfinance industry. In the next phase we undertook secondary research 
of leading MFIs, including Grameen Bank and two other prominent MFIs in Bangladesh, ASA 
and BRAC, as well as the early MFIs in India such as BASIX and Share Microfin. Our analysis 
of the strengths and weaknesses of the different business models of these MFIs gave us the 
perspective for the in-depth study of SKS. Over a period of three years, we tracked multiple 
sources that generated a wealth of data points on SKS. Case studies, dissertations, and reports 
from institutions that cover the microfinance industry in India provided multiple sources of 
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evidences for data triangulation to achieve contextual validity, or dependability of the data. 
Interviews with knowledgeable observers and players in the microfinance industry published in 
the business press were valuable to get first-hand views on various issues. Two important 
sources for assessing the social performance of MFIs, including SKS, were the annual State of 
the Microcredit Summit Campaign Reports and MIX MARKET Reports. Primary archival data 
on SKS was obtained for the time span of 1998 through 2009 from quarterly updates, monthly 
tracking reports and other documents posted on the SKS website. The longitudinal data enabled 
the construction of a narrative to connect events germane to the success of SKS.   
A three-stage coding process was based on the Strauss methodology (Strauss, 1987) for 
inductively processing data sourced from more than 500 documents. In the first stage, we listed 
all the data points, a process that corresponds to the “open coding” stage of the Strauss 
methodology. We examined various data points with lenses such as: What is going on here? Why 
is it done? And what does this data point indicate? The continuous assessment of data points 
based on periodic additions to the data set helped to strengthen the findings.  
In the second stage, we teased out various data points to unearth commonalities and 
detect patterns that could be clustered under distinct labels. For example, all the data points 
shedding light upon the ‘internal audit process’ in SKS were clustered under ‘financial 
compliance’, which is termed as an ‘axial code’ in the Strauss methodology. We consolidated the 
axial codes from the second stage into five succinct factors in the third stage termed as the 
‘selective coding’ stage in the Strauss method. For example, in the third stage, ‘operational 
innovation’ emerged as a common theme for two patterns identified in the second stage, 
standardized business processes and financial compliance. The analytical process used in this 
example is shown in Table 1. Our objective was to construct a parsimonious model advocated by 
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Eisenhardt (1988), who noted that “…given the typically staggering volume of rich data, there is 
a temptation to build theory which tries to capture everything.” (Eisenhardt,1988, p.547).   
TABLE 1. Analytical Process Used to Derive the “Operational Innovation” Factor   
Selected Data Points –  
Open Coding  
Clustering of Data Points 





SKS standardized the processes for   
- selecting a village 
- conducting the village surveys 
- forming the groups and the Centers 











Prepared “how to” procedures for 
a. conducting the weekly center 
meetings 
b. how to deal with problems of non-
attendance and non-repayment or 
issues raised by customers.  
 
 
Pilot Efficiency Project 
 
Pilot started in December 2007 with 30 
branches in AP, extended to 30 more 
branches in February 2008, to move from 
weekly meeting with clients to a fortnightly 
interval to reduce operational cost. Initial 
concern that clients may find it difficult to 
meet fortnightly repayment commitment 
was not reflected in the pilot project. Also, 
member attendance actually increased from 
70% to 80%. 
 
 
Internal Audit  
 
SKS was the first microfinance institution 
in the world to get an ISO certification for 
 
Internal Audit as an 
Innovation in MFIs 
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internal audit processes with a team of 225 
employees. It was certified by ISO 
9001:2000 on May 6, 2008 by a certifying 




Grading of Branches 
 
Internal Audit took an initiative in 2008 to 
grade all branches for linking staff 
incentives to branch grading based on 
parameters like documentation, loan 
repayment and disbursement, fund 
management, fixed asset verification, 
attendance, etc.  
 
We were able to cross-check the validity of our analysis of SKS with a managing partner of 
Sequoia Capital, which had selected SKS for its first investment in microfinance in 2007, and 
made a subsequent investment in 2008 after our interview with him. 
 
PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
Five factors emerged from our analysis of SKS, which are linked in a framework 
proposed for a catalytic innovator in microfinance. (see Figure 1) 




Two factors are essential for the social mission of providing financial services for the 
poor:  
1. Focus on Poor Customers: Customer focus should be the foundation of any business 
model since, as Peter Drucker put it over 50 years ago, the only valid purpose of 
business is to create a satisfied customer. For an MFI with a social mission, the focus 
should be not just on customers, but on poor customers. 
2. Social Entrepreneurship, which is characterized by the focus on creating social 
wealth, and is a pre-requisite for sustainability of social ventures (Zahra et al., 2009). 
For an MFI with a social mission, social entrepreneurship is an overarching factor 
that provides the compass for the other factors in the framework.  
The other three factors are components of a “systems-changing” model for achieving scale and 
financial sustainability. They can be viewed as the firm resources that could be deployed for a 
catalytic innovation instead of the traditional business objective of competitive advantage 
advocated in the resource-based theory literature (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991).  
1. Operational Innovation for deploying new ways of performing fundamental business 
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processes, commonly referred to as “reengineering”. 
2. Information Technology (IT) to reduce high delivery costs and manage portfolio risk 
3. Human Capital Management (HCM), a factor that can make or break manpower-
intensive organizations like MFIs. 
To set the context for our analysis, it must be noted that door-step banking was the crux 
of the SKS model to reach the unbanked poor in remote rural areas. This drove up operational 
costs, however, since loan officers had to travel to villages for meeting customers, making loans, 
and collecting repayments. SKS built on Grameen’s group-lending model to reduce this cost by 
increasing the number of customers handled by a loan officer. A Center was formed by 
combining 4 to 12 of the self-selected groups of five women serving as guarantors for one 
another. SKS made the Center also responsible for the payment of all the groups, creating in 
effect a joint liability model. A loan officer is assigned to each Center as the point of contact 
with the customers of the Center, thus enabling him to handle as many as 60 customers in a 
village at the weekly meeting. 
Focus on Poor Customers 
 The social goal of reaching the poor influenced all facets of SKS operations right from 
the selection of the villages, the targeting of poor clients in the selected villages and the delivery 
system. Customer focus on the poor was ingrained “in everything we do…even if it means 
operating against our short-term interests.” (Akula, 2008, p. 56) The semi-arid drought-prone 
Telangana region where SKS launched operations was not covered by other MFIs since villages 
in such regions are farther apart, making travel costs to these remote villages higher. Within 
Telangana itself, the most impoverished villages were selected where over half the population 
lives on less than a dollar a day; less than 30% of women are literate compared to 61% for the 
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state; and infrastructure is poor with some villages being connected only by dirt roads. Within 
the selected villages, SKS targeted the “Very Poor” households where per capita income is less 
than $1 a day and who have no assets, and the “Poor” households whose per capita income is $1 
- $2 a day and who have some assets, in keeping with its social mission to reach the lowest tiers 
at the BOP.   
The customer focus was factored even in the methodology devised for the village survey 
to identify members who met the eligibility criteria. An innovative technique called Participatory 
Rural Appraisal that uses highly-visual group exercises was used to get information from 
villagers, most of whom are illiterate (Akula, 2004). For example, a pictorial diagram of different 
items, say, goats and buffalos, was used for respondents to indicate how many of each they have 
by placing the corresponding number of stickers on that item. The visual nature of the exercise 
made the information captured transparent and easily understood, whereas a written survey 
would make the respondents fearful about what was being written down and for what purpose. 
 The customer-first philosophy of SKS dictated door-step banking despite the high cost of 
loan officers travelling to villages on mopeds on rough dirt roads and braving the vagaries of the 
hot summer and monsoon seasons. The deliberate choice of the most impoverished region for the 
SKS operations exacerbated the high travel cost. Another aspect of the SKS model is that weekly 
meetings were scheduled during the short window of time from 7 a.m. to 9:30 a.m. when the 
women were available so as to not disrupt their work schedule in the fields. These features 
contrast with traditional microfinance in India that requires borrowers to come to Branches and 
make monthly repayment.  
The size of the loan was based on information about the borrower collected during the 
formation of the group. It ranged from $50 to $300, to be repaid in 50 weekly installments from 
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the weekly cash flows. A cost-plus pricing model was used to set the interest rate for yielding a 
fixed profit of 2%. In states where SKS has attained scale, an average 24% APY was charged 
compared to the over 55% rate of moneylenders, who are the main source of informal borrowing 
for the financially excluded rural poor (Basu, 2004). SKS also provides interest-free emergency 
loans to tide over unexpected distress situations despite SKS having to pay commercial rates to 
banks for the funds borrowed for these emergency loans. This again underscores the focus on 
poor customers in its business model. 
The customer-first philosophy also influenced the way SKS recruited the “right type” of 
loan officers who could effectively deal with poor customers, and their performance evaluation. 
The loan officers are recruited from the same poor villages as the customers. This makes it easy 
for them to connect with the customers they have to serve. They also possess some knowledge 
about the customers to facilitate their interactions with them. The salaries of loan officers are not 
tied to repayment rates or the size of their loan portfolios. Otherwise, the pressure to meet targets 
could foster a tendency to hound borrowers in a difficult situation, or loan them more than they 
need. (Akula, 2008) 
Operational Innovation  
Our analysis identified two distinct areas for reengineering the business processes of an 
MFI: standardization for scaling operations and financial compliance that becomes important 
with scale. We discuss each in turn below. 
Before starting SKS, Akula had learned from his experience of working as a loan officer 
for a not-for-profit MFI in India that microfinance operations were inefficient due to lack of 
standards in processes, and hence not scalable. He identified areas where processes could be 
standardized starting from the selection of areas to open Branches, and covered every aspect of 
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an MFI’s operations, including the training program for loan officers.   
A standard methodology was established for selecting the underserved region and 
villages for opening Branches as well as conducting the survey to select the targeted customers. 
An Operations Manual laid out the details of the “how to” procedures for the tasks that loan 
officers have to carry out before starting financial operations. These tasks included forming 
groups and Centers, and conducting a five-day “Compulsory Group Training” program of hour-
long sessions to educate members on the processes of SKS. The manual also covered the 
procedures for conducting the weekly Center meetings, disbursing loans and collecting 
repayments, and making checks of loan utilization. Guidelines for how to deal with problems of 
non-attendance and non-repayment, or issues raised by customers, were also provided in the 
manual.  
The process for conducting the weekly Center meeting was also standardized to increase 
the efficiency of the loan officers. A fixed weekly repayment for each customer in round 
numbers of 25 or 30 rupees, i.e., multiples of five rupees (the smallest bill in India), cut the time 
in counting coins and making change. The Center meeting was scheduled at a fixed time and 
location in the village to ensure attendance by all members without loan officers taking the time 
to track them down. The fast turnaround enabled a loan officer to visit three villages instead of 
one in the limited open window in the morning. Other opportunities for standardization to speed 
growth were taken from the best practices of global giants. The factory-style training model used 
by McDonalds for the low-skilled workforce of its franchises was utilized for training SKS loan 
officers. The standardized training program cut the time for training loan officers to two months 
from the norm of four to six months in most MFIs. The goal is to cut it to one month. (Akula, 
2008) The decentralized hub-and-spoke model of Starbucks was used in the expansion strategy 
18 
 
of SKS, where Centers were created in clusters under the umbrella of Branches. Opening 
multiple Centers in one Branch helped build the SKS name among customers. It also enabled 
experienced staff from an existing Center to train the staff in a new Center. The minute attention 
that SKS paid to identify areas with the potential for standardization was instrumental in 
achieving its 200% annual growth, adding 50 Branches, 500 loan officers and 160,000 new 
customers every month.  
The fast pace of scaling operations brought to surface the need for financial compliance 
and accountability making internal audit an important function that required strengthening and 
training the audit staff. The quality of the rigorous audits done by the staff of 235 in March 2008 
across the 771 Branches in existence at that time earned the distinction of SKS being the first 
MFI in the world to get the ISO 9001:2000 certification. An important initiative undertaken by 
the internal audit group was to grade all Branches for the purpose of instituting staff incentives 
based on parameters like documentation, loan repayment and disbursement, fund management, 
fixed asset verification, etc. The audit staff strength was increased to 350 by early 2009 to 
improve the efficiency of audit processes by setting up separate audit teams for Branches, Head-
Office, individual loan products, internal audit training, quality assurance (ISO audit) and risk 
management. KPMG, an accounting consultancy, was also appointed to review the processes and 
suggest improvements. 
Information Technology (IT)  
SKS was a pioneer in using IT from the very start because of Akula’s conviction that IT 
was an imperative to cut transaction costs, a significant barrier for scaling microfinance. An 
Internet-enabled Management Information System (MIS) was developed in-house as early as 
2000, within two years of the company’s launch, connecting the Head-Office to the Branches. 
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The transaction data on loans, collections, etc. was entered for each customer by the loan officers 
in the PC at each Branch after their morning field meetings.  The system was custom-designed 
for ease of use by inexperienced field staff with no more than a 10th grade education to 
independently handle transactions for up to 600 borrowers. The training required for them to 
enter the data in the system had to be minimal to realize the cost advantage of using readily 
available, low-wage staff for data entry. Another constraint created by the inadequate 
infrastructure in the region where the Branches were located was the availability of power for 
only two hours a day.  The user interface of the system was simple enough to enable a loan 
officer to enter all the daily transactions in less than 30 minutes.   
The core of the MIS system is the Portfolio Tracker module that captures all the 
transaction data input by the loan officers.  A simple but telling example of the benefit of 
standardization of processes was the ability to pre-populate the fields for collections with data on 
the weekly loan repayments fixed for each client. The system generates the Collection Sheets for 
the loan officers showing the fixed amount to be collected from each client at the Center 
meeting. Only exceptions have to be recorded by the loan officers at the meetings, which in turn 
have to be entered in the Branch PC.  This saves time at both the Center meetings and at the 
Branch, and reduces the incidence of data entry errors as well. All Branch level transactions are 
consolidated and compressed so that they can be sent over a dial-up connection in less than two 
minutes. Summary data is available in the Head-Office within hours after the morning field 
meetings. Corporate staff uses the extensive reporting capability of the MIS to respond quickly 
to any problems in the field.  In particular, the system enables SKS to manage portfolio quality to 
diversify its risk.  For example, a few years ago it noticed that as many as 80% of loans in some 
Branches were for buffalo purchases. A buffalo disease epidemic or a sharp decline in the price 
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of buffalo milk could create the risk of huge defaults. The portfolio was diversified by finding 
borrowers in other businesses such as tea shops, brick-making and tire retreading. (Bellman, 
2006) 
The fully integrated MIS entailed an initial investment of over $250,000, a significant 
outlay for an MFI in its early stages of growth. But it delivered on the promise of reducing cost 
of operations through automation of transactions and better management of portfolio quality. The 
low operational cost enabled SKS to drop the annual interest rate charged to borrowers from 
36% in 1998 to 24% in 2006.  
SKS was also the first MFI in India to launch a smart card pilot project in October 2000 
to automate the “last mile of delivery” in field operations. However, the high cost of a single 
Smart Card ($3.30) at the time made the project unviable and put a hold on the rollout of the 
pilot. The positive outcome of the pilot was the interest of Visa International to collaborate with 
SKS to develop cell-phone based card readers. Customers could then use magnetic-stripe cards 
as cash substitutes and not just as an electronic passbook.  The cash-free system would also be 
safer than a loan officer carrying a lot of cash to villages. 
Human Capital Management (HCM) 
Human Capital is a critical resource for an MFI that deploys a door-step banking to bring 
financial inclusion to the rural poor. Since the loan officers are the sole point of contact with 
customers in door-step banking, the recruiting strategy for getting the “right type of loan officer” 
and their performance evaluation are important areas of HCM for an MFI with a social mission. 
SKS recruited the loan officers from the same poor villages as the customers since they 
had an inherent advantage of being able to deal effectively with their clientele. SKS also targeted 
the young, not much older than 20, yielding a cost benefit generated by the low-wage bill of a 
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young workforce. An additional benefit is the motivation of the loan officers to make the most of 
the job opportunity given to them. The salaries of loan officers were, unlike Compartamos, not 
tied to repayment rates or size of their loan portfolios. 
The real HCM challenge for SKS is to manage retention rates and ensure that quality of 
staff is maintained during its rapid scaling. By July 2009 the employee strength had ballooned to 
14,249 for serving 4.5 million customers. SKS has set an ambitious target of 15 million 
customers for 2012, which would require the workforce to expand to 39,000 employees. SKS is 
currently exploring avenues in both operational innovation and IT to address, at least in part, the 
HCM challenge facing it.  
A pilot project was launched in December 2007 in 30 Centers to double the efficiency of 
loan officers by reducing the frequency of Center meetings from weekly to fortnightly.  The 
concern that borrowers may find it difficult to meet fortnightly repayment commitments was 
allayed by the encouraging sign of no default in the pilot centers. The test is being extended to 
more Centers with plans to roll it out to all Centers in due course. An efficiency project was 
initiated in September 2008 to increase the productivity of loan officers in collaboration with 
Unitus whose affiliate, Unitus Equity Fund, has made an equity investment in SKS. The purpose 
of this project is to collect data on the time spent by a loan officer on performing his daily duties 
like pre-Center meeting preparation, Center meetings, and member acquisition process to 
identify bottlenecks and improve productivity.  
On the IT front, SKS announced in July 2008 a tie-up with Adrenalin eSystems, a 
subsidiary of Polaris Software (a prominent player in the Indian IT industry) to develop software 
for the human capital needs of SKS. This is the first of its kind solution for the microfinance 
industry to handle recruiting, training, performance management and payroll requirements for up 
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to 20,000 employees, according to its website. Presumably the software can scale to handle the 
targeted strength of 39,000 employees of SKS by 2012. 
Social Entrepreneurship 
Given that an MFI with a mission to bring financial inclusion to the unbanked rural poor 
is a social venture, it is obvious that social entrepreneurship has to be the overarching factor in 
the proposed framework to provide a compass for the other factors. 
According to Zahra et al. (2009), social entrepreneurship refers to “activities and 
processes undertaken to discover, define, and exploit opportunities in order to enhance social 
wealth by creating new ventures or managing existing organizations in an innovative manner" 
(Zahra et al., 2009, p. 519). Social entrepreneurs are “driven creative individuals who question 
the status quo, exploit new opportunities and refuse to give up.” (White Rose CETL Enterprise 
Presentation, date NA, slide 15) Akula, the founder of SKS, fits these criteria for a social 
entrepreneur. He made a childhood resolve to eradicate the jarring poverty that he (born in India 
but grew up in the US) saw when visiting India for the holidays. He began his career in 
microfinance as a means for dealing with this poverty and worked as a community organizer at a 
not-for-profit MFI after graduation in 1990. He found that microfinance had the greatest impact 
on poverty since it provided the base for other interventions like health and education. After 
finishing graduate school at Yale University in 1995, he returned to India as a Fulbright scholar 
to coordinate a project on providing microfinance loans to marginal farmers at another MFI. He 
learned from this experience that the traditional MFIs would never scale to reach all of India’s 
poor.    
Akula crystallized his ideas for creating a scalable model after returning to the U.S. to 
pursue a Ph.D. at the University of Chicago on the impact of microfinance. He identified three 
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constraints to scaling: “what I call the three “C’s” -- lack of capital, lack of capacity, and the high 
cost of delivery;” and developed his business model to deal with them: “a for-profit model to 
overcome the capital constraint, best practices from the business world to overcome the 
constraint of capacity, and technology to overcome the cost constraint.” (India 
Knowledge@Wharton, 2008, p.2) He pioneered door-step banking which not only gave the poor 
access to financial markets but brought it to their doorsteps. Interestingly, his business model did 
not impress the big donor agencies like the Rockefeller Foundation and Ford Foundation who 
thought he was too young and lacked the experience. Undeterred, he raised $52,000 from 357 
relatives and friends, including $10,000 from a small volunteer Indian American organization to 
launch SKS as a not-for-profit in 1998.  
Social entrepreneurship often involves combining resources in new ways for creating 
social value (Mair & Marti, 2006). Akula’s business model combined various resources to create 
financial inclusion for the rural poor such as using IT to cut costs, hiring local people in the same 
poor villages as the customers, and partnering with an external firm like KPMG for internal 
audit. 
Akula was featured in the CETL presentation referred to earlier as one who has “brought 
social change amongst poor women in villages” (slide 13) in the traditionally male-dominated 
Indian society by offering them an opportunity to become economically self-reliant. This also 
helps to boost the confidence of the SKS women customers, raising non-financial wealth in the 
form of social capital in rural India. Akula’s passion to serve the poor led to commercial 
partnerships with investors to overcome the constraint of capital for scaling. Sumir Chadha, a 
partner in Sequoia Capital who we interviewed in February 2008, listed three attributes that 
Sequoia uses for selecting companies to invest which were met by SKS. Passionate 
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entrepreneurship was one of the three.  
Vijay Mahajan, a veteran in microfinance in India and the CEO of the first for-profit 
MFI, BASIX, acknowledged Akula’s contribution as a catalyst of innovation and change in the 
Indian microfinance industry. He is quoted in an interview as saying that: “Vikram is passionate 
about what he does and is committed to the poor. He has achieved a breakthrough in terms of 
scaling up, entered difficult geographies…and showed the sector its unrealized potential.” 
(Sharma, 2008, p. 152) 
In summary, Akula’s social entrepreneurship has brought about socio-economic change 
through a game-changing solution for the nagging problem of financial exclusion in rural India. 
Validating SKS as a Catalytic Innovator    
           We outlined in an earlier section our rationale for selecting SKS as the research site for 
our study based on data as of 2006. Having discussed the five factors in our framework for 
catalytic innovation, we examine here whether SKS has continued to meet the criteria for a 
catalytic innovation in microfinance in terms of scalability, commitment to social mission, and 
financial sustainability (Christensen et al., 2006). We proceed to address the following three key 
questions for SKS using available data up to September 2009:  
(a) Was SKS able to scale? 
(b) Did it achieve its social mission? 
(c) Is it financially sustainable? 
The J-shaped growth trajectory of SKS through March 2009 shown in Figure 2 establishes the 
scale achieved by SKS. The momentum is continuing unabated. Within the span of one month, 
outreach grew from 5.01 million in August to 5.31 million in September 2009. 




According to the latest available Microcredit Summit Campaign Report, 96% of the total 
SKS clientele of 1.5 million as of December 31, 2007 were verified as poor living below the 
poverty line of $1 a day (Daley-Harris, 2009). Social performance should be seen not only as the 
end result (the impact) but as a process of achieving that result, according to Sinha (2006). This 
process should include “improving the social responsibility of the MFI towards its employees, its 
clients, and the community it serves” (p. 5). In the case of SKS, 76% of its clients as of March 
2008 belonged to castes defined by the Indian Government as marginalized communities. At the 
same time, the employee-base was also primarily drawn from these marginalized communities – 
65% out of the 6,424 employees.  
 The exponential expansion of SKS has been fueled in large measure by funding from 
venture capital firms, including two rounds from Sequoia Capital and Kismet Capital, and an 
investment of $50 million by Sandstone Capital, the largest investment in any MFI, in November 
2008 in the midst of a global meltdown in the financial industry. The large infusion of $135 
million in equity capital in SKS raises a legitimate question about its effect on the social mission. 
Akula’s response to this question in an interview essentially gave the following argument (Nath, 
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2009). Customer retention data show that the large base of SKS customers is extremely loyal 
because of its focus on poor customers. Loyalty builds trust that is essential for a long-term 
healthy business, which is what commercial investors want. Akula hence believes that social 
return is not incongruent with financial return. He takes issue with Yunus, Grameen Bank’s 
founder, who believes that microfinance should be a “social business”, i.e., merely self-
sustaining with no profit. Akula questions this concept by pointing out that Grameen Bank took 
35 years to scale to 7 million customers. At that rate it would take generations to scale to the 120 
million people facing financial exclusion in India. In this context, SKS is all set to overtake 
Grameen with an outreach of 8 million customers in 2010, within 5 years of becoming a for-
profit in 2005. On the question of the interest rate charged by SKS, the average 28% APY rate in 
2008 breaks down as follows: 12.5% cost of funds for SKS from banks, 8.5% staff cost, 3% for 
overheads and other administration costs, 2% for loan loss provision, leaving 2% for profit. In 
states where SKS has attained scale, the interest rates are lower at 24%. If processes are made 
more efficient, the interest rates could be reduced further since the profit margin is fixed by SKS 
at 2%. Although banks charge on the average a lower interest rate of 12.5% for borrowing, a 
World Bank study on access to finance for India’s rural poor showed that longer processing 
times for loans together with bribes varying from10% to 20% could result in a higher effective 
cost to borrowers (Basu, 2004).   
SKS has received a host of awards from 2000 right up to 2009 for the organizational 
innovation engineered through the various factors in the framework in Figure 1 except for HCM. 
These awards are listed in Table 2 and provide a form of external validation for our analysis.  
TABLE 2. Awards of Recognition for SKS: 2000 – 2009 
# Award Year Factor(s) Recognized 
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1 CGAP Pro-Poor Innovation Award 2000 IT 
2 Digital Partners Social Enterprise Laboratory (SEL) 
Award 
2001 IT 
3 CGAP Financial Transparency Award 2004 Operational Innovation 
4 Unitus Accelerator Award 2005 Operational Innovation 
5 Grameen Foundation USA Excellence Award 2005 Focus on the Poor 
Operational Innovation 
IT 
6 CGAP Financial Transparency Award 2006 Operational Innovation 
7 Planet Finance/ABN AMRO Microfinance Process 
Excellence Award 
2006 Operational Innovation 




9 Social Entrepreneur of the Year 2006 in India Award of 
the Schwab Foundation 
2006 Focus on Poor 
Social 
Entrepreneurship 
10 Ernst and  Young Entrepreneur of the Year Award 2006 2006 Social 
Entrepreneurship 
11 Akula featured in the list of Young Global Leaders by 
World Economic Forum 
2008 Social 
Entrepreneurship 
12 Social Performance Reporting Award sponsored by 
CGAP, Dell Foundation and Ford Foundation  
2009 Operational Innovation 
 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
Further research is required to validate the proposed framework for catalytic innovation. 
Good questions to investigate are: whether all five factors are necessary for a catalytic 
innovation?  Or, are they, taken together, sufficient? And, if not, what are the limitations? 
Another interesting question is whether the framework will hold for SKS itself as it progresses 
towards its target of 15 million clients by 2012, especially in the context of news reports of SKS 
going for an IPO in 2010. We are in the process of applying the framework to newer entrants 
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such as Bandhan, Equitas Micro Finance and Ujjivan and to other large MFIs in India which 
were started before SKS as non-profits and later converted to a profit-model, including Share 
Microfin, BASIX and Spandana. 
In this context, the economics of an MFI could be dramatically changed by viewing 
microfinance as a platform, and not as a product (Counts, 2008). This view asserts that the MFIs’ 
most important assets are not their loan portfolios but their high-quality relationships with the 
BOP customers. MFIs can leverage these relationships as a platform to distribute a range of 
products and services, not just financial ones. The new perspective on MFIs becoming a 
distribution channel for a host of private-sector companies enhances the catalytic nature of 
innovation in an MFI. SKS has already put this concept into practice, and started in 2008 to 
provide “the last mile solution” for companies to tap the large potential market in the bottom tier. 
This new initiative leverages the human capital created by SKS for its microfinance operations 
through the vast network of Branches and loan officers reaching the poor at their door steps. By 
leveraging its existing resources, SKS can create a new revenue stream that can be used to 
further its social mission through lowering of interest rates on loans and charges for other 
financial services. SKS has partnered with Nokia and Bharti Airtel, the largest service provider. 
In a pilot test, Nokia’s 1650 model with an Airtel connection and a loan from SKS to pay for the 
phone was offered to customers in selected clusters of villages with zero mobile penetration. The 
penetration jumped to 30% in just three months (Karunakaran et al., 2009). Another initiative of 
SKS was a tie-up with the German retailer, METRO Cash & Carry, to distribute their 
merchandise to over 500,000 SKS customers owning small provision stores. The commission 
from selling products is another revenue stream that adds directly to the bottom line, and has a 





MFIs have emerged as a promising channel for providing financial services to the poor 
unbanked sector. Since most MFIs are small catering to less than 2,500 clients and reach only a 
fraction of the poor, scale is a pre-requisite for an MFI to reach the poor. SKS is an MFI that has 
scaled to reach over 5.3 million clients in just over a decade. Its social mission of “empowering 
the poor to become economically self-reliant” was not abandoned in its pursuit of scaling. Latest 
available data from an independent rating agency verified that 95% of its clients as of December 
2007 were indeed poor. 
The focus of our study was to identify the factors essential for an MFI with a social 
mission to achieve scale and sustainability, a catalytic innovation. Based on the insights gained 
from our longitudinal study of SKS from its inception through October 2009, we have proposed 
a framework for a catalytic innovator encompassing five factors. Two factors, customer focus on 
the poor and social entrepreneurship, are vital for the social mission. The other three factors, 




All data pertaining to SKS reported in this paper have been extracted from primary archival data 
in the time span of 1998 through 2009 on quarterly updates, monthly tracking and other 
documents posted on their website www.sksindia.com. We took the precaution of printing all the 
data points from the SKS website, which was fortuitous since the new website that we accessed 
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